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Structural Limits of Capacity and Implications for Visibility 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - This paper fills the gap between defining and measuring the productive 
limits of a machine or system, and the impact of various assumptions about the 
productive potential of the nature and informativeness of capacity cost 
management systems.  The authors focused on the various ways in which multi-
dimensional limits (for example, time, space, volume and/or value-creating 
ability) can be used to define productive capacity.  Specifically, our research 
suggests that the limits used in establishing the capacity cost management system 
restrict the amount and nature of the information the system is capable of 
providing to management. 
 
Justification – Two reasons are identified for studying the impact of capacity 
measurements on organizations.  First, firms which make the best use of their 
resources can be expected to outperform their competitors.  The second arises 
from the potential structuration effect of capacity metrics.  Such an investigation 
makes capacity a visible, and hence an actionable, construct. 
 
Design/Methodology – To explore these issues, a combination of analytics and 
qualitative field research methodology was used.  The measurement dimensions 
were developed by analyzing the different reports, baseline measures, and metrics 
included in the various capacity models as suggested by the literature.  These 
analytics were enriched with observations obtained from field research. 
 
Findings – Maximizing the value created within an organization starts with 
understanding the nature and capability of all the company’s resources.  The 
outcome is the identification of capacity systems specifically suited for particular 
types of operations, both manufacturing and service.   
 
Practical implications - Such frameworks would allow organisations in 
developing economies, to make visible, the drivers of waste and productivity and 
to identify the primary assumptions and implications of various capacity limits. 
 
Key Words - Capacity management, Cost management models, Capacity limits. 
 
Paper type – Research paper.
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 Structural Limits of Capacity and Implications for Visibility 
 
1. Introduction 
There are two quite different, yet compelling, reasons for studying the 
impact of capacity measurements on organizations.  In a purely economic sense, 
that firms which ceteris paribus make best use of their resources can be expected to 
outperform its competitors (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  Since capacity 
measurements help identify the relative degree of productive versus 
nonproductive utilization this knowledge should be of great value to practitioners 
and academics interested in economic optimization. 
A second and perhaps more compelling reason for being interested in 
capacity measurement arises from the potential structural effects of capacity 
measurement metrics.  Capacity metrics create a unique “coding” of the time-
space dimensions of an organization’s productive capability.  They create an 
“analytical and useful space” for calculating, evaluating and comparing 
performance across multiple machines, systems, or activities (DeBruine and 
Sopariwala, 1994; McNair and Vangermeersch, 1998), making capacity a visible, 
and hence actionable, construct (Burchell, et al., 1980). 
Capacity can be viewed as a measurement of the value-creating ability of a 
machine or system (McNair and Vangermeersch, 1998).  But, how much of this 
potential resides in any one machine, any one system?  It is this issue—the 
difficulty in defining and measuring the productive limits of a machine or 
system—that remains at the heart of debate about capacity analysis and 
management.1  When measuring the limit of capacity Debruine and Sopariwala, 
1994, used a practical capacity measure based on the capacity the firm expected to 
activate, however in a later paper Sopariwala (1998) recommends using 
“maximum available capacity” (p. 34). There is considerable agreement in the 
existing management accounting literature that it is important to consider 
theoretical or practical capacity when making strategic and operating decisions 
(e.g., Cooper and Kaplan 1992; McNair and Vangermeersch 1998). Yet, less 
attention has been paid to the impact of various assumptions about this 
productive potential on the nature and informativeness of capacity cost 
management systems (DeBruine and Sopariwala, 1994; Brierley, et al., 2001).  
Without this examination it is unclear what exactly are the implications of various 
definitions of an asset’s productive limits (e.g., its base capacity measure), and the 
choice of one method over another remains one of opinion and preference rather 
than analytically grounded. 
This paper seeks to fill this gap, focusing on the various ways in which 
multi-dimensional limits (e.g., time, space, volume and/or value-creating ability) 
can be used to define and make productive capacity more visible.  Specifically, this 
                                                 
1
 Many of the early debates and articles on capacity spent considerable time debating how best to define a capacity 
baseline.  Authors such as Gantt (1915a) questioned the specific definition of “normal” capacity, while the NACA debates 
sought to determine whether practical or normal capacity should be used.  One of Gantt’s major beliefs was that a firm 
should use theoretical capacity if it were to truly capture its productive capability as well as its level of waste.   
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research suggests that the limits used in establishing the capacity cost 
management system (CCMS) bound the amount and nature of the information the 
system is capable of providing to management.  This paper builds further on 
existing literature (Hertenstein, et al., 2006) adding additional field study context 
and data to develop an analytical framework for defining and measuring 
productive capacity in both manufacturing and service settings.  Using the 
informativeness of the resulting systems, as defined by their completeness, 
stability and ability to make visible the drivers of waste and productivity 
(Hopwood, 1983), the analysis will seek to identify the primary assumptions and 
implications of various capacity limits for visibility and managerial action. 
Following the review of existing literature, three different models of 
capacity measurement and analysis will be explored, beginning with a standard 
cost models through an approach that links capacity measurement to the market’s 
perception of a firm’s value-creating ability.  In each case, the role played by the 
assumed limits of a system’s productive capacity on the nature and amount of 
information the system provides will be examined.  These observations and results 
will then be used to develop a series of conclusions that may serve as the basis for 
a more complex theory of capacity measurement.  Finally, conclusions will be 
presented with suggestions for future research into the role of limits in capacity 
cost management. 
 
2. Capacity:  An Interdisciplinary Perspective 
Historically, capacity analysis has been focused on planning and assessing 
the utilization of various machines and machine-paced processes within an 
organization.  Capacity utilization measures serve as a leading indicator at a 
macro-economic level, signaling the health of the economy.  When capacity 
utilization numbers drop, recession becomes a concern.  When they reach all-time 
highs, inflation worries are raised.  Given that these metrics play a key role in 
setting macroeconomic policy, one would assume that they must be fairly well 




To begin this discussion of capacity and the concept of limits, it’s useful to 
first develop the basic terminology for the various baseline measures of potential 
capacity (see Table 1).  As can be seen, there are significant differences in the 
concept of “productive potential” embedded in these various definitions.  A firm 
that believes it can only make 9,000 units with one machine may buy a new asset 
when it consistently requires more output than this amount, even though it is 
producing far below the theoretical limits of the machine.  In other words, the 
analytical space created by a normal or budgeted capacity definition appears to 




While it may seem counterintuitive, to suggest that managers will manage 
from the abstraction or coding of the physical embedded in the capacity measures, 
there is unfortunately empirical evidence that such blinding to physical reality 
does occur.  As shown by McNair, et al., 2003, managers tend to make asset 
decisions based not on the theoretical capacity of their assets, but rather on the 
relationship between normal and future expected demand (see Table 2).  
Specifically, a manager who believes that future demand is going to require 
108.7% utilization of their assets behave differently (e.g., may consider purchasing 
new assets) than those who perceive their utilization level to be 25.8%.  The way in 
which capacity was defined and presented within the firm’s reporting system 
appeared to alter the surface and deep structures, or conceptualization, of 




Empirical research suggests that annual budgeted capacity is the dominant 
form of capacity baseline used in European and North American firms (Drury and 
Tayles, 1994; Brierley, et al., 2001).  As noted by Brierley, et al., (2001: 228): 
There has been a lack of research examining the measurement 
of the denominator capacity level for overhead rates.  From 
the evidence available, the majority of firms use a measure of 
budgeted capacity and this is likely to have an adverse 
impact on the accuracy of product costs.   
 
Putting this discussion into perspective, average asset utilizations were 
reported as part of a firm’s financial statements prior to 1932 in the United States.  
Theoretical capacity was the accepted baseline measure during this period.  In 
1932, in the depths of the Great Depression, U.S. Steel reported it was only at 13% 
effective utilization of its plant (McNair and Vangermeersch, 1998).  It would 
appear based on the results of current research that many firms may have excess 
assets at near historical levels, and that these excess assets stand to drive up their 
cost of production and reduce their competitiveness and profitability in both the 
short- and long-term. 
One final example may be useful at this point.  Approximately six years 
ago, Anheuser-Busch, a leading US brewing company, adopted theoretical 
capacity denominator activity level as the basis for their capacity cost management 
system and capacity planning.2  A primary competitor, Coors Brewing, another US 
brewer, continued to use budgeted capacity as its denominator activity level.  In 
2002, a comparison of the asset acquisition policies and overall asset utilizations 
yielded a striking result.  Specifically, Anheuser-Busch experienced increase in 
both share and total volume, yet noted in their published financial statements that 
                                                 
2
 This information was provided by an anonymous source at Anheuser-Busch who had attended a capacity presentation by 
Dr. McNair and subsequently notified her that this change had been made. 
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it had reduced its asset base significantly.  In the same period, Coors lost volume 
yet purchased a significant level of new assets.   
Anheuser-Busch continues to obtain share through aggressive price cutting, 
while increasing its profitability overall. The stock market is rewarding this 
performance.  Conversely, Coors continues to lose share while profits plummet 
due to reduced industry prices.  It would appear from this casual evidence that 
Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) initial observations are quite applicable to the arena 
of capacity measurement.  Specifically, Anheuser-Busch’s superior performance in 
the beer industry appears to be at least tangentially related to the fact that it 
appears to know more accurately the relative productive performance of its 
productive resources.  This leads to the first research proposition for this study: 
Proposition: 
The way in which capacity is measured and reported seems 
to affect management decision-making as well as the 
economic performance of the firm.   
 
3.  Literature Review 
It could be argued that there is a potentially infinite variety of capacity 
reporting models available to managers in organizations.  Yet, March and Shapira 
(1982) suggest that there may be a relative degree of uniformity in such systems 
when they note that organizations characteristically do not solve problems; they copy 
solutions from others (1982: 98).  In other words, it would argue that ceteris paribus, a 
firm is likely to choose among the most publicly available forms of CCMS rather 
than investing in creating a new system. This being said, three advanced forms of 
CCMS were identified for use in this study from an examination of the extant 
literature in capacity (DeBruine and Sopariwala, 1994; Klammer, 1996; McNair and 
Vangermeersh, 1998):   
• CAM-I model 
• Logistics model 
• Value creation model 
Based on the criteria suggested by Feltham (1972) and March and Shapira 
(1982), these three systems were then compared in terms of their informativeness.  
Informativeness was defined as the number of dimensions of potential capability 
they emphasize (e.g., the number of limits established by the system) and the 
degree to which these dimensions are tightly bounded or defined with respect to 
their productive potential.  Specifically, they were examined in terms of their 
relative bias (what is made visible), the stability of the resulting cost 
estimate/signal (the quality of its linkage between past and future results, or 
uncertainty), and their completeness (the number and type of variances, or 
underlying variability, they can generate).   Table 3 details the way that each of 






In the 1990s CAM-I (Consortium for Advanced Manufacturing, 
International), a leading think tank for new management accounting models, 
embarked on the development of a more robust and informative capacity 
reporting model that would utilize the power of relational database designs and 
sophisticated data collection capabilities of modern manufacturing equipment 
(Klammer, 1996).  When describing the CAM-I capacity model, Klammer defined 
its objective in the following way, “Communicating idle capacity information is 
one priority of the capacity model” (Klammer 1996, 28).  
Debruine and Sopariwala, 1994 argue that using annual budget capacity 
companies hide excess capacity and are therefore unable to act on it.  By 
employing theoretical or practical capacity measures excess capacity costs can be 
reported separately and fixed costs become visible (Ostrenga, 1988).  Klammer’s 
CAM-I model not only highlights idle capacity, it provides information on the 
types and reasons for this idle capacity. This information in turn helps 
management understand the extent to which these non-value-added costs reduce 
corporate profit and focuses management attention on the need to more fully 
utilize capacity. 
The CAM-I model accounted for all the time available within a capacity 
system, separating this analysis on two dimensions (1) manned versus unmanned 
time; and (2) the effectiveness of the utilization of manned time (productive versus 
non-productive).  The costs of the system were also broken into two separate 
categories:  committed and managed.  Unmanned hours would be charged 
committed costs only (e.g., unavoidable fixed asset expenses), while manned time 
would be charged its share of managed (e.g., resources used to make the machine 
capable of producing, such as people and power) and committed costs.   
Each category of time (idle, productive, and non-productive) is then further 
broken down by primary cause into a system of variances, including machine 
breakdowns, planned maintenance, material problems, staffing problems, 
developmental time, and so forth.  Informed by the continuous improvement 
paradigm, the CAM-I model went beyond traditional definitions to inquire into 
the underlying categories, or causes of, wasted capacity.  
The logistics capacity model takes into account for the fact that in many 
industries capacity doesn’t remain fixed in space and that productive capacity in 
complex organization may have not one but a variety of productive, value creative 
uses.  For example, assets in a transport firm will be mobile and these assets will 
exhibit variability in their load factor, or output volume.  In order to track output 
and productivity of assets these types of firms developed “seat miles flown” or 
“revenue miles flown.” These measures focus on the output of the process and not 
on the process/system capability.  They are also relatively unstable over time as 
changes in prices, volumes, and available seats lead to changes in the capacity 
metric.  Finally, they are incomplete because they do not define any limits or 
boundary conditions.  While they can report variances over time in terms of asset 
utilization, and can be modified to integrate operational and financial metrics, the 
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failure to set limits creates an ambiguous, and poorly defined, system of capacity 
measurement. 
The traditional CAM-I model needs to be amended to address specificity 
and complexity of these very different organizations.  For example, the number 
and type of productive, nonproductive and idle time categories needs to be 
expanded as does the number and type of cost pools in order to reflect the 
differences in resource demands across various states of capacity utilization. 
Our last model of capacity applied and tested in the field is the value 
creation capacity model.  Since capacity is defined as the value-creating ability of 
an organization’s resources and systems, its definition and measurement of value 
may be relevant for the development of capacity models in a variety of settings.   
Capacity modelling in service settings represent a unique challenge because 
of the inherent intra- and inter-variability in the “capacity” of their core assets—
people.  Incapable of being bounded, the capacity of service-based systems 
remains ambiguous and difficult to objectively define and measure.   
The cost containment model takes one form of external data, benchmarks, 
to set standards and performance expectations.  These standards are more robust 
than those that a budget-based, or traditional system, would provide because they 
do not build from prior internal practices but rather from information about the 
potential of the firm’s resources to do work.  While tight boundary limits cannot be set 
on this productive capability, the system does make visible a higher plateau, or 
potential utilization, that can create the same pattern of decision making and 
performance improvements of a more complete, stable and unbiased CCMS. 
Over the past fifteen years, though, there has been a marked shift in the 
definition of what “value creation” means in modern organizations (Wayland and 
Cole, 1994; McNair, et al., 2000; McNair, et al., 2001).  Specifically, value creation 
has been transformed from an internally-defined construct of “value add” and 
“non-value add” activities as seen in the eyes of management, to an externally-
driven metric that builds from the customer’s perceptions of the value embedded 
in a product or service. Customer preferences, or their value profiles, are 
compared to the value proposition, or attributes of the product or service, to 
determine the relative competitiveness of one product versus another.   
The value creation approach originated in the strategy and marketing 
literature, and has been primarily focused on defining value segments within the 
general population and on ways to leverage the firm’s core competencies to 
improve its value proposition.  Recent work by McNair, et al., (2000, 2001) has 
extended these models and systematically connected them with the cost structure 
of the firm.  The results of this research have yielded the development of a five-
dimensional definition of cost within an organization:  (1) Customer value-add; (2) 
Business value-add, current; (3) Business value-add, future; (4) Business value-
add, administrative; and (5) Non-value add, or waste.   
The relative informativeness of the two models is not as easy to evaluate.  
While it is clear that they make very different aspects of the organization visible, 
and that the value creation model is a more complete system in terms of the 
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number and type of information signals it provides, it is not possible to do a direct 
comparison of their informativeness.  This comparison would require that one 
organization invest in developing and using both systems.  The information in the 
two systems is not redundant, but rather complementary.  As such, they fail to 
qualify for comparison under Feltham’s (1972) criterion. 
This being said, there are other issues raised by the value creation model 
that affect its informativeness.  First, there are nonlinearities inherent in the value 
creation approach (McNair, et al., 2001).  Specifically, one dollar spent on value-
add activities will generate more than one dollar of revenue.  In fact, these 
“multipliers” have exceeded a 40:1 ratio for a specific value attribute in some of 
the studied firms.  Dollars spent on anything but value-add fail to generate current 
revenues at all—they are costs but not revenue-generating.  This is a new concept 
in costing, one that may be initially difficult for managers to understand.  Feltham 
(1972) would suggest that the value of this information may be reduced because of 
this uncertainty.   Over time, this ambiguity should be reduced, but there is little 
or no expectation that the measures developed by the value creation approach will 
stabilize.   
In many respects, then, the value creation-based capacity system may be 
inferior in terms of the criteria of informativeness developed here.  But, it is 
equally possible that it may serve to change decisions in organizations to a much 
greater degree than traditional capacity models because it makes visible a new 
dimension of capacity—its ability to generate revenue growth.  It is a strategic 
model, rather than an operational or tactical model of capacity.  As such, it may 
ultimately have a greater impact on an organization because it has changed the 
calculative space of the firm.  These potential impacts remain untested and 
unknown due to the recent nature of this project and the underlying literature and 
research that it builds upon. 
 
4.  Research Methodology and Description 
A combination of analytics and qualitative, field research methodology 
(Yin, 1984; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was used to test the 
propositions underlying this study.   Specifically, the measurement dimensions 
were developed separately by at least three experts who analyzed the different 
reports, baseline measures suggested, and metrics included in the various capacity 
models as suggested by the existing literature on the models.3  These analytics 
were enriched with observations obtained from field research conducted in three 




                                                 
3
 In each case, the two researchers evaluated the systems on the stated dimensions.  In addition, three outside experts on 
capacity analysis, Dr. Richard Vangermeersch of the University of Rhode Island, Dr. Holly Johnston of Babson College, and 




The details of each site, the study time period and number of site visits, and 
the capacity cost model used by the firm are presented in Table 4.  As the table 
details, the site work was conducted over a period of five years.  The firms in the 
study were drawn from both the manufacturing and service sectors.  The size of 
the organizations studied varied greatly, ranging from Specialty Foods, a medium 
sized service firm providing “ready-to-eat” food items within a commercial 
grocery store setting to a large commercial airline that posted $3.2 billion in sales 
and a workforce of 22,000. 
The data collection activities focused on the comments and observed 
actions of managers at the sites, as well as the actual capacity reports and metrics 
used within the organization.  The on-site data collection was conducted as part of 
a longitudinal interpretative, grounded theory initiative (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967).  The interpretative paradigm recognizes that the researcher is actively 
involved in creating the reality, and interpreting the results obtained, during 
research within an organization. To alleviate some of the empirical concerns 
embedded in grounded research, subject statements are provided to the reader to 
provide a basis for assessment of the research findings or development of 
alternative interpretations. 
Having explored the basic theory, methods, and measurements used, 
attention now turns to the analysis of the three competing models and 
historical/empirical evidence of their informativeness. 
5. Informativeness in Action:  Analytical and Empirical Results 
A capacity reporting system is a particular type of accounting system, one 
that emphasizes the productivity of an asset or system against some preset 
expectation, or standard, of its perceived potential to create value for the 
organization and its primary stakeholders (McNair and Vangermeersch, 1998).  By 
the events they record, and those they ignore, these systems can be argued to 
create a form of reality for the organization—to shape its calculative and physical 
space. 
A CCMS, though, is also a reflection of the organizations in which it is used 
(Hopwood, 1983).  Metrics and reports that are deemed to be of little or no value 
to decision makers are unlikely to be incorporated in these systems (Feltham, 
1972), regardless of their potential informativeness.  These findings by prior 
researchers suggest that a one dimensional analysis and inquiry into the value and 
nature of capacity reporting will by nature be incomplete and inconclusive.  
Reflecting these arguments, our research findings will integrate analytical, 
archival, and empirical data based on three different field studies which 
incorporate and build upon the three capacity reporting systems presented earlier.   
 
5.1 Expanding the Limits: The CAM-I Model   
In 1998, Windows, Inc. determined that it needed to improve its operational 
measures and improve the integration of its financial measures (standard costing) 
with the measures used to manage the plant floor.  Ongoing decision support 
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problems were noted to be the driver of this change, as described by the financial 
manager of the business development group: 
We are having major problems with the launch of our new product line…and it 
sure doesn’t help that it takes so long to calculate costs.  The guys are changing 
the design every other day, taking out features and changing methods. But, 
they’re flying blind….frankly, we aren’t of much help.  We aren’t even into 
production and everyone is already ignoring the information out of the costing 
system…The plant floor has implemented TQM, lean production, and many other 
innovations that cut the time and cost to make a window.  But, we haven’t 
changed the costing system.  Translation? There’s no way to prove that these 
changes have or have not improved the bottom line.  We don’t really know what 
the plant is capable of, whether it is improving, or how to assess the impact of new 
demand on our resources, or any other of a number of important things..  As a 
result, I’m sure we’re making questionable decisions….but unless we get some 
new tools, we’re not going to be able to convince anyone—even ourselves!!!. 
 
The production of windows is both capital- and labor-intensive.  The window 
assembly lines have high labor content, but remain paced by one or two key 
machines that perform difficult or dangerous operations.  Windows also 
manufactures a wide range of basic wood components for its windows and 
maintains the capability to extrude plastic coverings on its core wood components 
to improve the appearance, durability, and ease of use of its products.   
The inadequacies of the standard costing model within a more traditional 
manufacturing setting were highlighted above.  These problems expand as the 
demand for decision support information grows, and as the emphasis on 
identifying and eliminating waste from production increases.  In other words, the 
bias inherent in standard costing had made it irrelevant.   
When the CAM-I model was implemented, there was an immediate 
reaction from managers throughout the organization—some positive, some not so, 
as the following comments by the V.P. of Operations suggest: 
I knew, somehow, that things just weren’t going as planned in the door 
subgroup.  But I couldn’t put my finger on what it was…I mean, the 
numbers in our reports were all in line, yet I couldn’t see how all of those 
expensive machines were in the end buying us very much.  Volumes hadn’t 
changed, so it only made sense that the cost of a door must have gone up, but 
every time I looked at the accounting reports, it just wasn’t there.  So…I 
figured I was missing something.  Guess now I’d have to say I wasn’t. 
 
I like this; by the way….I can finally compare these cost centers in some 
meaningful way.  The apples-to-apples stuff…that helps me counter a cost 
center manager’s claim that his or her group can’t be compared to another…I 
can finally hold them all to the same set of criteria, and track whether they’re 





The CAM-I model provided a level of comparability for a diverse set of 
operations in the plant that had not been available before, a key aspect of 
informativeness (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  It also provided a means for 
tracking historical utilizations and to assess the effectiveness of new asset 
purchases in terms of actual cost and efficiency effects.  The door sub-plant, which 
was a “star” prior to the capacity analysis, was now found to have failed to gain 
the labor and cost improvements it had promised would result from the 
acquisition of new equipment.  On the other hand, the extrusion plant, which had 
been noted to be a major problem, was found to have high levels of utilization and 
marked improvements in overall costs and performance over the study period. 
Assessing the CAM-I capacity model against the dimensions of 
informativeness developed by Feltham (1972), it appears to be less biased than 
standard costing or the operational perspective because it makes visible a wider 
range of productive dimensions that correspond to primary causes of waste and 
cost in manufacturing.  Its operational capacity measures are stable over time, due 
to the use of theoretical time and rates.  In addition, productive capacity is 
calculated using a stable measure of the consumption of capacity by one unit of 
output—cycle time, or the amount of elapsed time between units coming off the 
production line.  Cycle time is constant for each type of product, and can easily 
accommodate a variety of units with different time demands on the bottleneck. 
On the cost side, its metrics have been broken into two primary categories 
corresponding to how responsive the cost is to changes in utilization.  This 
suggests that the cost metric is also more stable than that developed under 
standard costing.  In terms of completeness, the number of limits has been 
expanded significantly to two on the operational side, and one on the cost side.  
The capacity information has been broken into a wide number of variances that 
reflect the primary causes for idle and non-productive time and cost.  Finally, it is 
inclusive in that the cost and operational information have been integrated into 
one report that makes comparison of these two primary performance dimensions 
visible.  It would seem that the CAM-I model is significantly more informative 
than the standard cost and operational capacity models. 
 
5.2 Boundaries in Space and Time:  Logistics and Capacity 
Focused on providing low cost air transportation, Easy Air had always 
managed its fleet of planes with one driving goal:  to maximize the time in the air.  
The reason for this was simple—only when a passenger was en route was the firm 
earning revenue. Easy Air utilized “seat miles flown” and “revenue miles earned” 
to track their productivity.  This logic, reinforced by the industry-defined measure 
of capacity and the beliefs of its founder, had fueled profitable growth at Easy Air 
in an industry notorious for massive losses and business failures. 
In the late 1990s as the industry and the company experienced volatility in 
prices, changes in volumes and available seats these traditional logistics capacity 
measures didn’t provide best information in terms of costing the capacity system.  
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A senior financial manager at Easy Air succinctly described the problems 
his company was facing, and the goals it was pursuing: 
We sure don’t want to end up like the rest of our competitors, losing money 
by the bucket and not knowing how to make things better.  No matter how 
good things get….we simply have to manage the company in good times so 
we can survive the bad times.  And there have been some awfully bad times 
lately for the airline industry.  We just don’t use them as an excuse…they 
are a challenge, a reason to keep looking for ways to get a little bit better at 
what we do. 
 
That’s why we’re so hooked into this capacity issue…heck, we fly our assets 
all over the place and we only make money when people are on them and 
we’re getting them where they want to go on time with no hiccups along the 
way. But right now we’re measuring it just like everyone else.  It doesn’t 
feel right, but to date we just haven’t found a better way.  I worry, 
though…if we’re using the same measures, won’t we risk getting the same 
results?   How do we know if we’re getting better or simply growing 
volume?  Where could we improve and what would it mean?  These are the 
questions I get asked to look at…and I don’t have a good answer right 
now…. 
 
The Easy Air site provided an excellent opportunity to look at the 
informativeness of a capacity reporting system that was unbounded with one that 
was more completely defined.  The challenge was to identify the number and type 
of limits necessary to stabilize the cost and capacity metrics the system would 
develop. 
In examining capacity from the perspective of its boundaries or maximum 
ability to create value, it became clear to the project team that capacity for an 
airline would need to be bound in time, in “space” (e.g., load factor), and the 
degree of effective utilization of this “time and space” form of capacity.  Three 
specific limits were required to frame the capacity of the system.  None of these 
limits, though, emphasized the distance flown, which had been the prior 
definition of capacity.  Distance was not a dimension of value creation that was 
easily bounded—many factors influenced how many miles were flown on any one 
day by any one plane, creating ambiguity in the resulting metric.  Time and 
available seats per plane (or “tail” in airline terms), on the other hand, could be 
tightly defined.  No matter what was done with a plane, it was only available for 
8,760 hours a year and could only convey a specific number of passengers at any 
time. 
As the extensive research project on measuring capacity at Easy Air 
evolved, it became clear that there was one other boundary or condition that 
would need to be considered to effectively capture not only the potential capacity 
of an airplane but also how and why variations in utilization occurred.  While 
there were air control and weather issues affecting the plane while en route, the 
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major issues it struggled with emerged when the plane was on the ground—the 
interaction of the plane with ground operations placed unique limits on the 
plane’s productive capacity.  To the extent that ground operations, such as loading 
and unloading baggage and boarding passengers, was done inefficiently, plane-
based capacity would be sacrificed. 
Figure 1 
The capacity model that was derived from this analysis is presented in 
Figure 1.   As can be seen, the number and type of productive, nonproductive and 
idle time categories have expanded significantly, reflecting the addition of 
additional limits to the CAM-I model.  Similarly, the number and type of cost 
pools was greatly expanded to reflect the differences in resource demands across 
various states of capacity utilization.  This expansion in cost pools included the 
development of ground operation costs (capacity and activity-based) for those 
times when the plane was at a gate or being serviced.   Failures, such as problems 
with bag handling, lost luggage, or stranded passengers, were also analyzed for 
their impact on plane capacity and the total costs incurred by Easy Air during its 
normal operations. 
The new capacity system reflected a marked improvement in the 
informativeness.  Specifically, it made a greater number of forms of utilization 
visible, and focused on a clearly defined and bounded aspect of capacity, making 
it less biased than the prior model used by the firm.  Having established these 
limits tightly, the resulting measurements became quite stable over time and 
volume changes—these changes were explained, not hidden in a moving average 
or measure of capacity.  The system was also much more complete on every 
dimension of this construct—number of limits, number of variances supported, 
and inclusiveness/number of cost pools.   
Easy Air’s transition from one system of capacity reporting to a second 
provides the clearest illustration of Feltham’s (1972) arguments.  Since it can be 
assumed that the other information signals received by management were 
unchanged by the change in capacity reports, the information value embedded in 
these two systems can be compared and evaluated.  The issue that remains, 
though, is whether this change in information content leads to changes in 




Several events subsequent to the roll-out of the revised CCMS suggest that 
changes are beginning to occur.  The most marked of these changes is illustrated 
in Figure 2.  When the total capacity of the company was summarized across a 
normal operating day, the radical ramp up in flights and plane utilization that 
began at 9 am East coast time (EST) and ended at 7 pm on the West cost (PT) 
became quite obvious.  What was clear in talking with Easy Air managers was that 
they had not been aware of this phenomenon—it was not visible or apparent in 
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their traditional capacity system because this system did not track utilization in 
terms of time.   
Once the issue of shoulder time was understood, management turned its 
attention to identifying the incremental profit of adding flights to the beginning 
and end of the day—to increasing its level of productive capacity utilization.  The 
change in the CCMS had had the required effect to qualify as a change in its 
information value—it had changed management’s understanding of the problem 
as well as the decisions being made within the firm.   
 
5.3 Revisiting Capacity in Service Settings:  The Role of Customer Value Creation 
Specialty Foods is a large specialty food producer whose employees 
perform a variety of activities.4 Specialty Foods provides one illustration of how 
capacity cost systems may evolve (see Figure 3) to incorporate value creating 
capability of the systems.  Variances are developed for each of the five primary 
states of capacity. The model, reflecting the basic report structure developed by 
CAM-I (Klammer, 1996), emphasizes total value created across the range of 
activities performed by Specialty Foods’ employees.  As suggested earlier these 
activities need to be sorted in non-value add, business value-add-administrative, 
business value-add-future and current and customer value add.  While the 
capacity reporting grid has not been fully populated for this example, the firm is 
currently collecting the information required to complete it.  Data collection 
process is resulting in some interesting conversations at Specialty Foods as 
employees think of connections between time spent and the ability of activities 
performed to impact revenue generation.   
Figure 3 
 
How does the informativeness of this system compare to that of the 
traditional cost containment model?  Both incorporate externally-defined limits to 
offset some of the inherent measurement problems in service settings.  Both are 
relatively unbounded, in that the maximum amount of value the organization 
could create cannot be defined.  Both incorporate both operational and financial 
metrics and present a reasonable number of variances to explain variability in 
performance.   
The primary difference between the two models lies in their definition of 
capacity.  The cost containment model attempts to use a more traditional measure 
of capacity utilization—the productivity of the firm’s assets.  It is a cost-centered 
and cost improvement-driven approach.  The value creation approach, on the 
other hand, emphasizes the revenue generating capabilities of the firm’s resources.  
Productive time becomes tightly defined as the time and costs incurred that a 
customer directly benefits from.  In this respect, the value creation model more 
                                                 
4
 As with all of the reports and analysis presented in this paper, the actual numbers, results, and features of Specialty Foods 
has been disguised.  The transformations used retained the accuracy of the underlying relationships, but were scaled to 
hide the true identify of the firm. 
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closely proxies the concept of cycle time and productive cost in more well defined 
machine-paced settings.   
 
6. Summary and Opportunities for Future Research 
The purpose of this paper was to fill the gap between defining and 
measuring the productive limits of a machine or system, and the impact of 
various assumptions about the productive potential and the nature and 
informativeness of the CCMS. This was done by testing the proposition that the 
way in which capacity is measured and reported seems to affect the management 
decision-making as well as the economic performance of the firm. To confirm this, 
three advanced CCMS models were tested in different organizational settings. 
These three systems, their basic description, and the nature of the limits they place 
on resource capacity are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5 
 
Specifically, this research suggests that the limits used in establishing the 
capacity cost management system restricts the amount and nature of the 
information the system is capable of providing to management. Maximizing the 
value created within an organization starts with understanding the nature and 
capability of all the company’s resources.  The outcome is the identification of 
capacity systems specifically suited for particular types of operations, both 
manufacturing and service.  Such frameworks would allow organisations in 
developing economies, to make visible, the drivers of waste and productivity and 
to identify the primary assumptions and implications of various capacity limits. In 
particular when assessing the CAM-I capacity model against the dimensions of 
informativeness developed by Feltham (1972), it appears to be less biased than 
standard costing or the operational perspective because it makes visible a wider 
range of productive dimensions that correspond to primary causes of waste and 
cost in manufacturing.   
With the logistics model, the CCMS had the required effect of qualifying as 
a change in its information value—it had changed management’s understanding 
of the problem, as well as the decisions being made within the firm.  With respect 
to the value creation model it may be inferior in terms of the criteria of 
informativeness developed here.  But, it is equally possible that it may serve to 
change decisions in organizations to a much greater degree than traditional 
capacity models, because it makes visible a new dimension of capacity—its ability 
to generate revenue growth.  It is a strategic model, rather than an operational or 
tactical model of capacity.   
Opportunities for future work in the area of CCMS exist in further 
exploration of visibility of limits on the capacity measures and systems.  There is a 
need for more data from different organizational contexts and decisions for which 
capacity systems are needed.  While the data from three field study suggests the 
benefits of better visibility of CCMS for decision-making, more work is needed to 
better understand how managers interpreted the information from different 
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capacity systems and what alternative courses of action might be considered with 
alternative capacity cost information and knowledge. More work needs to be done 
to identify the modeling of connecting capacity cost systems) to incorporate value 
creating capability of the systems.   This paper contributes to the existing literature 
on capacity cost and visibility (Brierley et al., 2001).   Overall the authors believe 
that these models and their adoption to specific organizational types, will allow 
firms which make the best use of their resources, to outperform their competitors 

















The maximum amount of capability of a machine 
or process.  In practice this is often described as 
“24-7, The best you can be.” 
There is a maximum of 8,760 
available hours in a year.  If a 
machine can produce, at best, 
one unit every 10 minutes, its 
theoretical capacity would be 




Theoretical capacity reduced for “unavoidable” 
downtime.  In practice, engineering estimates 
normally reduce theoretical by 30% as a first 
pass at establishing practical capacity limits. 
There are still 8,760 hours in a 
year, but now we only expect 
to make a unit every 14.3 
minutes (10/.7).  The practical 
capacity would be 36,792 units 




Normal capacity is the average utilization of an 
asset over a 3 to 5 year period.  Note that 
attention has been turned away from the 
capability of the machine or process to the way 
in which that asset is utilized.   
Let’s now assume our 
machine is only run one shift 
per day.  Its normal capacity 
would be 8,736 units (2080 
hrs. times 60/14.3), or only 
16.7% of the original capability 
of the asset. 
Budget The coming years expected demand for output 
from a machine or process.  Once again, the 
planned utilization, not capability, of the asset 
serves as the basis for this definition. 
The firm expects to produce 
9,000 units in the coming year 
on this machine. 
Actual The actual production achieved with the asset 
for a given period. 
The firm was able to produce 
9,500 units during the year. 
 
 
Table 2   Comparative Capacity Utilization Metrics 
Capacity Baseline Actual 
Utilization 
Utilization Metric 
(Actual over Baseline) 
 
Name of Metric 
Budgeted capacity (9,000 
units) 
9,500 units 9,500  or 105.6% Utilization 
 9,000 
Variance to Budget 
Normal capacity (8,736 
units) 
9,500 units 9,500  or 108.7% Utilization 
 8,736 
Variance to Normal 
Practical capacity 
(36,792 units) 
9,500 units  9,500  or 25.8% Utilization 
 36,792 
Variance to Practical  
Theoretical capacity     
(56,250 units) 
9,500 units  9,500  or 18.1% Utilization 
 56,250 








Emphasis What dimension of system 
capacity is measured? 
 
Degree of bias 
 
Visibility 
The number of productive and 
nonproductive capacity uses 
that are identified, tracked and 
reported by the system. 
Consistency of signal over 
time 
The number/size of the 
capacity baseline measure 
from one period to the next. 
 
Stability 
Consistency of signal over 
various levels of utilization 
The degree of change in cost 
estimates as productive 
volumes change. 
Scope Number of limits 
Variability Number of variances 
 
Completeness 
Inclusiveness Number of cost pools and/or 
estimates incorporated 
 




Windows Inc Easy Air Specialty Foods 
Period of study 1998-2000 2000-2003 2003 































Type of CCMS 
used 

















































Industry Specific Category Hours






% of total 
$'s
Off Limits Airport/Flying Restrictions


























Total Capacity Hours + Costs





























Figure 3   A Sample Value Creation Capacity Report 
Category Hours
% of total 
hrs Rate Total Dollars




Off Limits Management Policy (Holidays) 85.00             0.5% 5.25$      446$               0.15% 0.031$         
Marketable Idle but Usable 2,843.00        16.2% 5.25$      14,926$          4.94% 1.051$         
2,928.00        16.7% 5.25$      15,372$          5.09% 1.083$         
Paid Breaks 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Excess time in prep 11,284.50      64.4% 19.65$    221,740$        73.40% 15.616$       
Scrap 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Meetings 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Ordering 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Inventory 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Training 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Create new recipes/Products 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Rotate stock 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Prep batch 290.00           1.7% 19.65$    5,699$            1.89% 0.401$         
Clean-up from batch 377.50           2.2% 19.65$    7,418$            2.46% 0.522$         
Fill cases 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
11,952.00      68.2% 19.65$    234,857$        77.74% 16.539$       
Food Quality 2,640.00        15.1% 19.65$    51,876$          17.17% 3.653$         
Food Healthiness 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Service Quality 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
Presentation/Cleanliness 0.0% 19.65$    -$                0.00% -$            
2,640.00        15.1% 19.65$    51,876$          17.17% 3.653$         
Total Capacity Hours + Costs 17,520.00      100.0% 302,105$        100.00% 21.275$       
Number of employees 2














Table 5     A Range of CCMS Models 
 




   (Klammer, 1996) 
Shifts attention to the “state of 
preparedness” (Church, 1934) of 
the underlying asset or system.   
Classifies capacity utilization in 
terms of various categories of 
productive, nonproductive, and 
idle time. 
Theoretical capacity baseline is 
adopted.  Two primary limits 
established within system:  
time and effectiveness of 
utilization. 
Economic impact of capacity 
utilization integrated into model 
through use of committed and 





    (McNair, et al., 2003) 
Examines shifts in definition of 
capacity as the asset is allowed to 
move within space. 
Interdependence between assets 
or systems is examined as the 
core asset moves within space. 
Activity costs used to fully capture 
the economic implications of 
different forms of variation and 
interaction between systems. 
Theoretical capacity baselines 
developed on four dimensions:  
Time, space or volume of the 
core asset, effectiveness of 
core asset utilization, and 
interaction of core asset with 
other primary systems or 
assets. 
Cost model expanded to 
include multiple states of 
preparedness, utilization, and 
interaction with other systems. 
 
 
Value Creation Approach 
    (McNair, et al., 2000; 2003) 
Shifts focus of definition of 
productive utilization from an 
internal perspective (defined on 
units produced or activities 
performed) to an external 
perspective (customer-defined 
value creation). 
Underlying definitions of utilization 
and value become increasingly 
perceptual. 
Emphasis shifts from one asset or 
system to the organization’s 
capability to create value. 
Limits defined now on both 
physical features (time, space, 
effectiveness of core asset 
utilization and potential 
interactions) as well as the 
value-creating ability of the 
productive effort (value-add, 
business value-add, and 
nonvalue-add). 
Limits and costs established in 
terms of perceptual features, 
such as the value creating 
capability of a resource, activity 
or system are unbounded, 
nonlinear, and unstable. 
Cost model expanded to 
include multiple dimensions of 
productive and nonproductive 
capacity across the 
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